Tags
Allen Dulles, BP, CIA, Coup, Iran, John Dulles, Mohammad Mossadegh, Mohammad Reza Shah, Overthrow, Stephen Kinzer, The Shah, United States of America
In 1953, a new Prime Minister took the helm of power in Iran, the western educated Mohammad Mossadegh. With passionate beliefs in democracy and nationalism, Mossadegh sought to modernize and westernize the nation, a policy that put him at odds with the nation’s monarch, Mohammad Reza Shah (the Shah), a western backed figure. To do this, Mossadegh targeted international entities harvesting the natural wealth of the country, most notably BP (British Petroleum). Mossadegh spearheaded a proposal that would nationalize Iran’s oil fields, compensating Britain for the facilities – the proposal passing the Iranian parliament unanimously (Kinzer 117).
Naturally, British authorities resented Mossadegh’s move, British Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison saying, “Persian oil is of vital importance to our economy. We regard it as essential to do everything possible to prevent the Persians from getting away with a breach of their contractual obligations” (Kinzer 119). They needed to find a way to maintain power.
British authorities approached Secretary of State John Dulles and, in extension, his brother Allen Dulles (head of the CIA), drafting the idea that they could portray Mossadegh’s rule as Communist infiltration to garner support in their effort to remove him from power. That “the risk of leaving Iran ‘open to Soviet aggression’” was a “compelling” factor in the necessity of American action.
After receiving the newly elected President Eisenhower’s approval, planning the coup began. CIA operatives were given “suitcases full of cash to destabilize the regime”. John Dulles contacted US Ambassador to Iran, Loy Henderson, asking him to find Iranians supportive of their cause (Kinzer 123).
After building a substantial network of paid supporters, the CIA led a series of riots in the streets of Tehran, the climatic set on August 19th where thousands took to the streets of Tehran demanding Mossadegh’s resignation (Kinzer 127). At its height, General Zahedi, the CIA bought and paid for leader of the coup, proclaimed via radio broadcast that he had been named the new Prime Minister by the Shah who, incidentally, had been brought into the fold by American General Norman Schwarzkopf, attaining the Shah’s secret blessing months before hand.
The day’s final battle concluded when the military bombarded Mossadegh’s house, causing Mossadegh and his supporters to surrender to Zahedi’s troops. The coup, codename Operation Ajax, having successfully ousted Mossadegh, concluded with Mohammad Reza Shah returning to his throne with a feeling of safety, Zahedi as the new Prime Minister and Mohammad Mossadegh sitting in jail.
The power structure restored favoring western (mainly now American) interests, the Shah became a powerful ally for the U.S. in the middle east. Now a top purchaser of American weapons, and the U.S. having a partial stake in Persian oil, the two nation’s new relationship, and the blatantly obvious fact that the U.S. had a hand in the coup, led to undercurrents of anti-Americanism.
As historian James A. Bill concludes, “[American intervention] locked the United States into a special relationship with the Shah and signaled the powerful entrance of American intelligence and military activity into Iran. The U.S. intervention alienated important generations of Iranians from America, and was the first fundamental step in the eventual rupture of Iranian-American relations in the revolution of 1978-79″ (Kinzer 201).
Non-Linked Sources:
Kinzer, Stephen. Overthrow. New York: Holt, 2006.